Abstract. -Historiography on Spanish colonial trade stresses the essential role played by non-Hispanic mercantile networks in the economic expansion in the Atlantic. The Flemish and Dutch merchant community of Cadiz maintained a prosperous trade, and throughout the enlightened XVIII century, the old enemies of the Hispanic Monarchy had developed certain sophisticated operations within the framework of trade between Spain and America, from within the very heart of the state monopoly. In this presentation, I deal with some of the features of the mercantile networks developed by this foreign colony settled in Cadiz and their trading practices. Through an analysis of such networks, I try to analyze their mechanisms and the extent of their influence in the Spanish trade with America between 1680 and 1750 and how they could maintain their business connections.
INTRODUCTION: CADIZ, A SMUGGLING SOCIETY
In its wide general context, Spain depended greatly on the intervention of foreign agents to carry out its external trade practically from the end of the Middle Ages and, especially, throughout the centuries of the Modern Age. This is why the most significant studies on Spanish merchant communities have emphasised the importance of the presence of multiple communities of merchants of different nationalities within the Spanish trading system with America. Paradoxically, in a country where the established, apparently official system centralised by the Crown gave rise to the Spanish Carrera de Indias, urban socie-ties, characterised by a large number of foreign migrants, in fact broke the so called commercial monopoly. 1 The various kingdoms that made up the "composite monarchy" depended structurally on a network of interchange and integration that included them in a broad range of regional interactions and processes of change, which extended from the 15th through to the 18th century. 2 In their functionality as "official" ports of the Spanish monopoly with America, both Seville and Cadiz combined a number of characteristics which brought together many factors relating to their nature as "entrepots" and as centres for re-export. As naval bases, for the preparation of the galleons for the Indies, they attracted a high level of immigration, developing a very dynamic frontier-like "social environment" which gave rise to a structural dependence by the Spanish commercial system, especially in relation to America, on the import of European manufactured goods introduced by foreigners. As a pre-American antechamber, Cadiz was, as was Seville, a frontier society characterised by contraband and illegal trade, both seen as two types of complementary activity responding to the versatile economical opportunities generated in this type of society. 3 This reality had been noticed by Spanish statesmen and political-economic thinkers since the 17th century: "[...] then foreigners did not need to resort to open smuggling or to declare it in order to send their merchandise to the Indies, because the very Spaniards who bought it, brought it to Seville or Cadiz and there loaded it on the fleets and galleons with the hope to sell it second-hand to America. Other times, traders from Andalusia acted as middlemen". 4 This simple explanation of the operational mechanisms uncovers a reality: foreign traders were not alien to the Spanish monopoly; instead they fed off it and were its most important supporters at a time when Spain sustained its exhausted Atlantic imperialism with the blessing of Europe. Alliance, interdependence, and coexistence on both parts were the true nature of the relationship between the Spaniards and foreigners in Cadiz. In reality, the American trade was not in the hands of foreigners but Cadiz society as a whole because the colonies of foreign traders were totally integrated within that society. These trading colonies formed true micro-societies integrated into the real Spanish society of the Ancient Regime. 5 Most of the economic activities relating to external mercantile activity were in the hands of these foreign colonies, since their companies were heavily monopolised or, at least, functioned as middlemen and providers of capital. Maritime powers (especially France, England, and the Netherlands) carried out direct trade with the Indies, at the same time as Northern European firms operated through their factors and agents, from the very heart of the Spanish monopoly.
Colonies of foreign traders were not only numerous in many Spanish port cities, but also had infiltrated into Spanish economy and society, using strong settling mechanisms as well as linking their families into a symbiotic relationship with all Spanish social groups. Although conclusive figures are still not available, a general demographic assessment of such groups has already been made, showing multiple strategies, some of them having a very subtle existence, whereas some others were completely illegal, such as the fraud and smuggling activities in the trade with America. Whether legal or otherwise, such strategies did not change substantially for more than two centuries. Due to the nature of Cadiz, foreign colonies had a considerable impact on the evolution and development of the economic relationship between Northern Europe and the south of the Iberian Peninsula. This is clearly shown, especially, in the influence that Southern Spain had on the Atlantic markets. It is worth highlighting that, in the most recent historiography, we have moved from studying those colonies in situ to analysing them as actors and factors in a process of spatial and regional integration spreading beyond all national borders. 6 The complexity of the networks, finely interwoven by the various colonies of merchants of different nationalities in and around the American and Spanish markets and ports, deserves a deeper investigation. Such an investigation should aim at studying the role played by the mercantile actors who built the foundations supporting the different monopolies. Such monopolies were created by a multitude of trading companies thriving in some heavily competitive markets. These companies were swayed by shifting winds that affected the social fabric at political, social, and economic levels.
This interaction of interests explains the main characteristics of how the different elements of the colonies dispatched their merchandise: not through contraband as such, but through a series of legal mechanisms that, with the help of the Spaniards, including their own officials of the Casa de la Contratación, the Spanish Board of Trade, had been created and adapted to the Spanish commercial system. This work will expand and analyse the functionality of these trading colonies within the context of Cadiz in the 17th century, and will describe the legal strategies used to trade with various port cities of America, 6 Manuel Bustos Rodr guez, Cádiz en el sistema atlántico: la ciudad, sus comerciantes y la actividad mercantil, 1650-1830 (Cadiz 2005 specifically with some Antillean ports and the circum-Caribbean, places with which the Dutch Republic had also developed an important direct trade parallel to that established from Cadiz; this was due to the close cooperation with the "Flemish nation" of which many Dutch from the northern provinces, together with other groups of merchants, had become part.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FLEMISH AND DUTCH TRADE IN CADIZ
The trade carried out by foreign colonists in Cadiz in the timeframe between 1680 and 1750 maintained, apparently, some general characteristics from the first half of the 17th century. This trade was closely related to a series of stop-overs which affected several ports, such as Seville, Sanlúcar de Barrameda, El Puerto de Santa Mar a, and Málaga. After the Twelve Years' Truce (1609-1621) there was an increase in the migration of the Dutch to Cadiz. Between 1609 and 1661, a period known as the Dutch phase of the Hispanic Monarchy, the Dutch commercial houses, that included a large number of Sephardic Jewish companies from the Spanish kingdoms that had emigrated to Amsterdam, won the struggle between the western European countries by overtaking or overcoming their rivals for the position with respect to Spain. This took place in a context that was increasingly related not to decisions taken by the Spanish authorities themselves but connected to a series of circumstances that occurred outside the frontiers of Europe: the struggle for colonial possessions. Within this framework, the larger part of the Dutch business in Cadiz developed thanks to the open cooperation between families of merchants arriving from the Low Countries that, in practice, did not reflect the legal differences between the two nationalities: the Dutch Republic on one hand, and the immigrants from the southern provinces of the Low Countries still included in the Hispanic Monarchical orbit until 1713 on the other. To summarise, migration from the 17 provinces of the Low Countries over a period of more than three centuries and an institutional framework give special connotations to the relationship between Spain and the Low Countries; the community of Flemish origin divided into two separate colonies, though not officially recognised in Spanish territories until the Peace of 1648. Nevertheless, the so-called Antigua y Noble Nación Flamenca (Ancient and Noble Flemish Nation) in Seville and Cadiz (into which many merchants from the Northern Provinces still continued to integrate) and the Dutch consulate would continue to maintain intrinsic links between them. At times, there was a clear rivalry between them in the ports where they lived together, but sometimes they were complementary to each other and maintained a convenient alliance, depending on the situation, as happened in Seville throughout the 16th century or in Tenerife during the War of Spanish Succession. 8 Today, it is a well known fact that the Peace of 1648 between the Republic of the United Provinces and the Hispanic Monarchy, rather than stressing their differences, fomented political co-operation at various levels strengthening diplomatic ties and recognising the economic links between Spain and the provinces of the Low Countries. This became apparent especially regarding commercial issues with the Spanish overseas, during the Treaties of The Hague between 1650 and 1651. A great deal of this trade was done via Cadiz from thereon (and this was one of the major breakthroughs achieved in the Peace of Munster): the fleets of the Dutch Republic were allowed free access to Spanish ports, including those of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, V.O.C.), and the convoys of the Society for Mediterranean Trade (Societёit van de Levantse Handel) from Amsterdam and Middleburg. 9 Therefore, Flemish and Dutch merchants became active middlemen, in clear competition with the English and the French, in the Andalusian regional market as well as in the export business of colonial products. After the successive crises suffered by the Flemish convoy from Ostend and the unsuccessful attempts by the government of Brussels to maintain the Society of Ostend, the fleets from Amsterdam and Middelburg became almost the only means of sustaining the maritime route between the 17 old provinces and the Hispanic markets.
Both the Peace of Munster and the Treaties of The Hague in 1673 were landmarks where the Dutch achieved two of their main objectives: on the one hand, they were granted the right to engage in trade with the American ports by the Spanish Monarchy; on the other hand, they were allowed to settle and trade in Spanish cities, and to send ships to them. It is a fact that the Dutch stepped into a favourable position in the Spanish markets, partly due to the increasing disagreements between Spain and both England and France, especially between 1650 and 1660. Gaining direct control over the access to Spanish markets both in America and in mainland Spain was the key issue for Amsterdam commercial firms, as this was the best way to ensure the survival of their trade routes and the links between several different economic areas. This was also made possible by Spain's heavy structural dependence on the Dutch trade. Therefore Cadiz rose to become the key centre to several markets in the second half of the 17th century. Cadiz was also a major port of call in the Atlantic routes to the Canaries and America.
It seems a paradox that a great influx of Dutch immigrants to Cadiz happened in the second half of the 17th century. Despite the fact that very few cartas de naturaleza or naturalisation letters were granted by the Casa de la Contratación in that period, a large number of commission agents and representatives from the Low Countries settled in Cadiz in those years. Many more naturalisation papers were granted to Flemish than to Dutch citizens, since the latter hardly ever met the requirements. Very few such letters were granted to the Dutch between 1612 and 1693. The same situation happened in the 18th century. 10 Moreover, there were very few contratos de compañía -company contracts -signed in Cadiz by Dutch merchants during that period: only seven between 1650 and 1750. That is a very small number compared to the total of 108 contracts signed by merchants of all nationalities. There is a simple explanation for both these facts: Spanish sources give little or no information about the migration of a temporary labour force involved in secondary trading and financial activities arriving in Cadiz within a specific framework, i.e. the dienscontract or "office contract", which was signed either in the Dutch cities themselves or on board the ships bound for Spain. This migration process can be framed within a social context where single, young men, born into families of traders and seamen, would temporarily leave their homes. Many of them belonged to the Catholic minority that had emigrated from the Southern Low Countries, others were Jews. Most of them would end up in Spanish port cities as partners of Flemish or other local merchants, bringing with them a dienscontract which explained their temporary stay. Such contracts enabled them to set up an office or warehouse in order to send and receive money to and from Amsterdam, and also goods for redistribution towards various destinations.
Despite the success of the Dutch direct trade with several American ports, the Dutch presence in Cadiz rose during the second half of the 17th century. From the Archivo Provincial de Cádiz we see that the migratory influx to Cadiz was much more important than Dutch migration to its own American enclaves, which was, demographically speaking, a complete failure.
11 Between approximately 1680 and 1740 Dutch migration to Cadiz increased; in a 1662 census, there was a large number of Dutch taxpayers (31), from whom over 11.000 reales de vellón were collected. The Genoese and the French came second with 27 individuals in each group, with a similar amount of taxes levied. There were also 14 Englishmen and ten Flemish. 12 Although most of them were only temporary residents, a few settled, establishing houses and businesses as they found a favourable social environment. The Dutch colony had more than 40 or 50 families. In contrast to the actually sparse Dutch presence, whether in American ports or in Cadiz, their commercial activity was very important. 13 However, it should be stated that, from the sources available so far, it can be claimed that Dutch trade in the Atlantic has been grossly overestimated, and it only represented a small fraction of the overall Dutch trade worldwide, since its trade in other regions was significantly 11 Crespo Solana, Entre Cádiz y los Países Bajos (note 2), p. 139; Pieter Emmer, "The Dutch Atlantic, 1600-1800. Since the final decades of the 17th century, the Dutch companies in Cadiz that worked for the Society for the Levant Trade became interested in linking these businesses with the American fleets that sailed from Cadiz. One of the reasons that encouraged this was the crisis in the Mediterranean trade around this time; they succeeded in including some ships coming from Amsterdam into their own fleets from New Spain. In later decades this would imply a general practice based on the sale in Cadiz of several ships from Amsterdam consigned to an agent of the Dutch Levant Society which, once their names were changed, were included with all their merchandise into the fleets of New Spain.
One of the first instances of this practice was in 1699, when a merchant originating from Haarlem, and a member of the Flemish nation, Mart n Guillermo Van Hemert, dispatched a Levante company ship destined for Veracruz. In the year of his death Mart n Guillermo Van Hemert acknowledged that he had a "business house and commercial offices" in Cadiz as cosignatory of the Dutch Levant Trade Society (the so called Directors of the Levant Trade and of Navigation to the Mediterranean, or College of Directeuren van den Levantschen Handel en Navigatie in de Midellansche Zee), but because of the crisis created by the wars, he had redirected his business to the American markets, which were safer than those of the Mediterranean area, as his business was "[...] both on my own account and from consignments, entrustments and commissions from different persons amongst my counterparts from the kingdoms and provinces of the North".
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The main business connections were the American ports of Portobelo, Cartagena de Indias, Buenos Aires and, especially, Caracas. Direct trade with Amsterdam was used to carry colonial products of great demand in Europe, the most highly profitable of all trading activities carried out by the Dutch. Such activities were almost certainly complemented with indirect trips via Cadiz. The Spanish authorities always fought the illicit direct trade realised by the Dutch. However, it is very interesting to note that foreign trade through and from Cadiz was deliberately accepted and, by and large, except during certain wars, Dutch trade from Cadiz enjoyed a seamless continuity. This was due to the economic and social integration of the Dutch and Flemish colonies in this city.
A quantitative analysis shows that the Dutch commerce with America, specifically in the circum-Caribbean area and the Antilles, was greater than the indirect trade through Cadiz; 16 very high numbers were registered between 1701 and 1750. 17 However, by and large, trade via Curaçao was not detrimental to the Cadiz trade, as direct and indirect routes were actually complementary to each other, their importance being related to the ports they used. Throughout the 18th century, Cadiz was linked to the destination ports for the fleets, galleons, and registered ships of the Spanish monopoly even before the marginal areas of the Caribbean were included in the routes in 1740. According to the data gathered on the participation of Flemish and Dutch merchants in the fleets, galleons and registered ships, the cargos on fleets and galleons, particularly on the former, were larger up to 1740. Dutch and Flemish involvement in registered ships rose significantly during that year, while their participation in the system of fleets and galleons decreased considerably. 18 Conversely, Dutch trade -and smugglingfrom its enclaves in the West Indies had always targeted those areas that had been heavily marginalised by the system of fleets and galleons but which had developed strong economies with a surplus produce due 16 to their agricultural output. They also tried to reach agreements with the colonial elites in areas such as Panama or Venezuela. Their goal was to gain profits by financing local enterprises, such as cocoa-producing farms, and also by securing exclusive rights to transport the goods to Europe and -most importantly, as this was their most profitable business -to provide them with slaves. Exceptionally, the Dutch also traded directly with Cuba and Santo Domingo. Nueva Granada was also one of the main areas for the Dutch to settle, although profits gained from the trade at these ports have been overestimated. Dutch presence in these markets resulted in a flagrant violation of the unwritten colonial pact whereby overseas territories would not engage in direct trade with other than their respective metropolis. Not only Spain, but also France and especially England were affected by Dutch trade. In fact, England had the Netherlands as its main enemy with regard to England's monopoly with its own American colonies. The long-term consequences of this direct Dutch trade were more important from a functional and structural standpoint than in terms of profits. Dutch cargo ships, highly attractive because of their low cost and their readiness and speed, constantly encouraged transit trade in the Caribbean both for the Dutch themselves and for other foreign traders. All this led to a high development of tropical, single-crop economies and their regional economic integration.
The Cadiz trade in the 17th and the 18th centuries was fundamental to Dutch commerce in Europe because Cadiz provided access to various interrelated areas. In addition, the American trade became a profitable alternative for the ships engaged in the Mediterranean trade, at the time when it went into a crisis and had to face fierce competition from the English and the Genoese. In certain circumstances, Cadiz was a type of port of call warehouse providing profitable access to American markets. It was a very convenient port of call for the Dutch, greatly appreciated by them on their long transatlantic journeys. As a result, Cadiz was highly appropriate for storing goods from various markets, such as Asia Minor, Italy, North Africa, or Sub-Saharan Africa (ivory was brought into Europe by the caravans coming from Africa). VOC ships also called at Cadiz in order to store products from the Far East. Certain Cadiz partners involved in such business trips were Flemish who had settled in the capital of the Spanish monopoly.
During the second half of the 17th century, these Dutch-Flemish communities were able to keep their profitable business, although with strong competition from France and England. These two countries wanted to seize from the citizens of the Dutch Republic the privileges granted to them by the Spanish government. The inability of Spain to supply its colonies with products that were in growing demand was a fact; this greatly favoured the collaboration between foreign and Spanish merchants, since the latter were forced to buy goods from foreign middlemen from North European firms in order to be carried on the American fleets. When the War of Spanish Succession (1700-1714) broke out, such arrangements were upset, with two main consequences. First, both English and French merchants were granted a series of privileges that brought them to a highly advantageous position. Secondly, the Spanish government began a series of reforms which, although intended to strengthen Spanish monopoly, were not enough to keep foreign interests away from Spanish cities and ports. Cadiz was a city where foreign merchants had generally developed and perfected a sophisticated series of symbiotic instruments of integration into society at all levels, especially economic and social. Through such symbiosis, for Flemish and Dutch communities, even though they had been pushed away from their top position, this was almost "business as usual". In 1713, when the Peace of Utrecht was signed, Cadiz traders eagerly expected the forthcoming implementation of certain commercial treaties that would undoubtedly bring back their former privileges. European trading firms were based, making this city the most important international financial and trading centre of its time. After the transitional phase which the route between Amsterdam and Cadiz went through during the final years of the War of Spanish Succession (between 1709 and 1714 approximately), maritime connections between both ports began to recover. This happened due to the regular route of the fleet of the Levantse Handel, being established institutionally by several previous agreements between the Spanish Monarchy and the States-General. 21 The Society would fit out and inspect a convoy bound for Southern Spain, and the Amsterdam Admiralty would oversee the whole process. There is rich information about the way this commercial route was organised that can be found both in Amsterdam and Cadiz, where there are countless freight contract documents.
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At a time when the decline of Mediterranean commerce was becoming apparent, the Amsterdam-Cadiz route was linked to other regions and more attractive markets. The official connection between Cadiz and America forced many businesses, previously trading with Eastern areas, to relocate their contacts and partners to American ports. The route between Amsterdam, Cadiz, and the American ports was fundamental for Dutch commercial companies. There is a very interesting document that offers an important assessment of this route: the report on the Spanish fleet attacked and wrecked near Vigo in 1702. That year represented a crucial moment in the political context, as the AngloDutch alliance had declared war on Spain. During the war or since the beginning of the 18th century, the majority of commercial houses in Amsterdam showed their dissatisfaction at such war actions towards a country in which they had strong commercial interests, as those companies sent their goods to American ports on board the Spanish fleets. The value of such cargoes ranged between 500 and 2.000 florins for each company. Ever since, such fleets always left from the Bay of Cadiz, where agents of those Amsterdam-based commercial companies stored goods for the owners and shipped them out as instructed. In August of 1702, the port cities of Rota and El Puerto de Santa Mar a, in the Bay of Cadiz, were raided by an Anglo-Dutch fleet.
The Spanish fleet sailing back from America, initially bound for Cadiz, was forced to seek shelter at the port of Vigo, in Northern Spain. A second Anglo-Dutch fleet waylaid the Spanish ships, and most of them were wrecked and sunk. After the event, an inventory was made, from which it can be understood why Dutch companies did not approve of a war that jeopardised their commercial interests, as the losses made in this type of naval disasters were huge. 23 When studying the characteristics of Cadiz-based Flemish and Dutch commercial companies, the first impression is their high degree of complexity. This is due to a long process of integration into local society, at levels far exceeding the merely economic aspect. The main reason for the massive arrival of foreigners in Cadiz was their involvement in the American trade: most members of the Flemish and Dutch colonies were merchants (34,8%). Very often, already settled Flemish families functioned as welcome centres for many small and medium traders coming from the commercial and manufacturing cities of the Dutch Republic when they arrived in Cadiz intending to make profitable business. In the decades following the Peace of Utrecht, there was a new migratory wave of Flemish and Dutch citizens into Cadiz; this was followed by a sharp rise in Flemish businesses, coinciding with the relocation of the Casa de la Contratación from Seville to Cadiz. There was also a steep rise in maritime traffic from this port after 1715. Nevertheless, the open rivalry between English, French, and Flemish traders is worth noting, as well as the predominance then reached by British trade, which practically superseded the United Provinces in its economic relationship with Spain. The strategies of Cadiz-based Flemish and Dutch businesses bear a strong resemblance to those developed by communities of these nationalities who settled in other geographical areas of Europe, such as the Baltic and the Mediterranean.
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The interrelated group of mercantile and financial activities was carried out, generally, within a particular legal framework; i.e., the commercial company and the way trade was organized was very much like the connections between the networks of correspondents and maritime routes. Thus, the existence of a commercial company provided internal cohesion. Also, the organization of such companies was very similar to other associations of correspondents or agents; their evolution and dynamics, although fluctuating was stable in the long term. Centralisation of the networks, together with their size, allowed capital to flow and to be deposited for credit purposes in the cities for later use. Techniques and mercantile practices carried out through such activities did not experience a great evolution in time. Deposits of money, commission, currency exchange, insurance, as well as the various occupations related to maritime transport were some of the key aspects on which the organizational system of these companies was based.
Two essential pillars, the goederenhandel or warenhandel (trade of goods) and the deposit of money in the cities, were intrinsically related. These were essential for traders in the American market, as they enabled them to store goods to be loaded on fleets bound for New Spain as well as on the registered ships that set sail regularly to the various ports around the Caribbean and the mainland. The object of the credit deposits was to maintain the trade of goods, since the majority of such goods was carried by the fleet of the Levantse Handel.
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Founded in June 1625, this society specified in its regulations that a branch should be set up in Cadiz, where merchants and correspondents or agents, both in Amsterdam and in Cadiz, should pay a series of taxes in order to guarantee the legality of this trade. This convoy began to arrive in Cadiz annually, coinciding with the time of year when preparations were being made for the departure of the fleets and galleons arranged by the Spanish Board of Trade.
The relationship between goods and deposit of money was very important because it was also the means to check the consignee's effectiveness at the port: ships loaded with goods carried for a commercial company arrived at their destination where the consignee was the company's agent. The agent would then store, sell, and redistribute the merchandise, paying the business overheads at the port and keeping the money that was not his own, on deposit, to be used later as instructed by his partner. The accounts would then be settled when the supplier thought it appropriate, or at significant events in the life of the partners, such as a wedding or a death. Some types of documents, such as the inventories of bankruptcies, though few, give details of how the deposits were made and safeguarded, and how payments between suppliers and buyers were organised.
Dutch merchants played an important role as middlemen in these indirect business transactions, with regard to the flow of capital between the marketplace -Cadiz -and the financial capital -Amsterdam. In this way the exchange of money and goods went round in a full circle. This continued despite the fact that, in some instances, many years would elapse between the start and completion of a business transaction with America via Cadiz. In most cases, such deposit accounts were opened in Cadiz, with the purpose of storing both capital and merchandise destined for the ships bound for America, in locations close to the ports in the Bay of Cadiz. Warehouses were located in Cadiz and in El Puerto de Santa Mar a, and the agents regularly sent out the merchandise, either in their own name or in someone else's, either on the fleets or on registered ships. The way such deals were conducted makes it difficult to estimate the volume of goods shipped and received by the Dutch community in Cadiz; the same applies to all other foreign communities. But it is a known fact that the structure of those exchanges was substantially invariable: for example the export of Spanish fruit, raw materials (such as wool), wine, and colonial products in exchange for textiles and other manufactured goods imported into Spain that could then be shipped on to America. Such was, in essence, the basis of this traditional economic relationship. According to some specialists in the economy of the Low Countries during the 17th and 18th centuries, up to the year 1700 between 150 and 200 ships every year would travel the route between Amsterdam and Cadiz, and would then carry up to 30% of the silver that arrived in Cadiz from America. 26 Documents found in the General Archive of the Indies in Seville complement notary documents from the municipal archives in Amsterdam and Cadiz. Therefore it is feasible to make a general and approximate assessment of the evolution of the trade since 1713. The fluctuation of profits was closely related to the flow of trade that Dutch merchants maintained with American ports. It was also linked to the flow of the Cadiz economy. Information relating to the participation of fleets, galleons, and individual registered ships is available on a database, as well as the conocimientos of goods signed by those traders involved with the fleets and registered ships bound for the Indies. 27 There is deep controversy over the amount of precious metals contained on the fleets returning from America to be transported to the Low Countries, as relevant available data is distributed over a number of sources. Nevertheless, the data collected by Morineau and Garc aBaquero from the Amsterdam Gazettes must be mentioned because of its interest. There is further information available from Spanish sources that demonstrate the Dutch ability to obtain American silver, even after 1700. In fact, the amount of metal that arrived in Amsterdam was very high, and such quantities explain, to a great extent, the large quantity of silver in circulation in the Low Countries; in fact, there was a huge surplus, despite the large amounts that flowed to the East. This situation had a strong influence on both the great financial rise of Amsterdam and the serious cycles of crises that began in 1720. 28 However, profits obtained by Cadiz-based Dutch traders were, comparatively, much smaller than those obtained by the French. France, together with England, had penetrated deeply into the Spanish markets; jointly both countries obtained almost 42% of the silver registered on the returning ships. 29 Between 1721 and 1740, when the reforms carried out by the administration of Phillip V were implemented, it became apparent to foreign merchants that they would have to use the classic convoys of fleets and galleons for their commercial purposes. The years up to the end of the 1730s were very difficult for several reasons: first, the crisis suffered by Europe because of the War of Spanish Succession; second, the recurring problem of the Spanish merchant navy, in urgent need of expanding its ship building -this was the main reason for the creation of the Intendencia General de Marina (or General Administration of the Navy). 27 The conocimientos were a type of notary deeds which listed and described the goods shipped by each merchant and their value. The complete information has been included in the "Crespo DynCoopNet Database" in the One of the common problems with Spanish commerce was that the Spanish monopoly institutions themselves had to charter foreign ships. The General Administration of the Navy in Cadiz had the cooperation of the Dutch navy for the campaign in Sicily and Sardinia, a project planned in Cadiz between 1718 and 1719. 30 They also chartered French and English ships for various activities, such as transporting tobacco from the Canary Islands, for example the ship Nuestra Señora del Rosario belonging to Juan Baptista Christian. In February 1720 they chartered the San Juan Bautista of Juan Achard and the Virgen del Rosario of Matheo Clavel as warships for patrol duties in the Strait of Gibraltar.
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Foreign traders also carried illegal loads even on the ships of the Spanish Armada, which was in need of arms, ammunitions and all types of provisions, and among those who provided these were also foreign traders. This was allowed surreptitiously mainly because Spanish seamen themselves also smuggled merchandise on their own ships. 32 Another case was the competition between courier ships and registered ships. There are proven instances of ships bringing contraband silver on behalf of foreign traders of Cadiz, some of them Flemish working closely with suppliers in Amsterdam and other Northern European cities. A specific case is a ship from Havana which docked in the Bay of Cadiz on June 2nd, 1718, carrying 1,850 pesos unregistered, with the knowledge of her captain Pedro de Iztueta y Aljobín. This breach of the law did not stop the captain and the master of the ship from sailing again in October of the same year on another ship, the Nuestra Señora del Carmen, bound for New Spain carrying documents for the Real Servicio.
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There were many contributions to a slump in the fitting-out of the fleets, which had a strong negative influence on private trade. There was a further underlying problem that explains the decline in the participation of the Dutch in the ships for the Indies: a sharp rise in direct 30 participation by England, as well as the strong competition posed by the members of the British colony in Cadiz. In addition, fleets and galleons during that period were very badly affected by misfortune: many accidents on the high seas and shipwrecks, combined with the need for longer stays at American ports delayed return trips between 20 months and five years. There are multiple testimonies of the damage caused to the purses of Cadiz-based foreign merchants, and as a consequence, they had to delay payments to their partners in the North. 34 However, the largest amounts of gold and silver recorded as having arrived in Europe, according to the Gazettes, are for the 1720s. At the same time there was an increase in the involvement of the Flemish and Dutch in the fleets and galleons. It is possible to assess the peak years of that involvement, with regard to the number of ships loaded and the amounts of goods and products sent to America. The highest level of involvement in the fleets and galleons took place around 1717, when trade tribunals were relocated from Seville to Cadiz. It was also a time when a large number of fleets was fitted out and sent (such as that in 1720, in which a large number of Flemish and Dutch merchants were involved).
The main method of trading with America via Cadiz was to load goods on the fleets and galleons. The level of involvement during the second half of the 17th century and the first part of the 18th century was very high, but the Anglo-Spanish War in 1739 negatively affected the whole Cadiz trade. Dutch merchants then began to suffer stiff competition from the English in Cadiz; prior to that, in 1734 only 147 Dutch ships anchored in the Bay of Cadiz, which was only 14,6% of the total for that year of 596 English and 228 French ships. 35 Frequently, foreign Cadiz-based traders had to use English and French ships because of a shortage of available Dutch vessels, a situation that had been unknown before.
SELF-BASED NETWORKS AND LEGAL STRATEGIES
The precise structure and network connections that Cadiz-based Flemish and Dutch merchants had with the American ports cannot be fully 34 Cases described in AHPC, PN 9/1589, 661-666; 23/5317, 703; 9/1578, 306 and GAA, n.a., 11457/109; 11374/129. 35 Merchants had many vested interests in the involvement in the fleets. Since Cadiz was a gateway to America, many commercial companies regarded the American market as suitable for a more lucrative business (more profitable certainly than the trade carried out by the Levantse Handel with the Mediterranean ports). Unfortunately, it is not possible to find out whether this trade with Spanish America via Cadiz was greater than direct trade with the ports of the Dutch Republic or, indeed, higher than that carried out mainly from its own Caribbean colonies. Despite a ban, it is known that a large number of ships that left Amsterdam under the flag of the Dutch States-General crossed the ocean bound for the Spanish territories overseas. This could happen either deliberately or because of bad weather and adverse winds. On many occasions, such as the case of the Veleta Marija in 1746 the ships would touch at Cadiz and then Tenerife, before crossing the Atlantic towards Cartagena de Indias, Buenos Aires, or Caracas. 39 However, more often than not, when arriving in Cadiz as part of the fleets of the Levantse Handel, these Dutch ships, after a convenient change of name, were registered as galleons or joined the Spanish fleets bound for America. How were they able to do this? Obviously with the help of Spanish merchants, or from the Flemish settled in Cadiz or, indeed, when given the green light by the officials of the Board of Trade, who also took part in this illegal practice. In many cases these introductions were made with the consent of the port authorities while equipping and preparing the fleet destined for America. Others were made because foreign merchants were already accustomed to trading with the Indies, like Cornelio Mathias de Roo, owner of the ship San Juan Bautista, owned by Baltasar de Guevara, which sailed in the fleet of Tierra Firme in 1721. 40 Although there is no definite quantitative data, Dutch involvement in the fleets, galleons, and registered ships might have been very high and diversified, such as the underwriting of marine risk policies, or appointing a testaferro or middleman, as well as the other usual commercial activities. There are reports that a high percentage of the trade in the 1720s with the ports of Havana, Veracruz, and Cartagena de Indias was carried by Dutch shipping from Cadiz. Interestingly, though, in Portobelo, fierce competition from the French meant that hardly any other European nation was able to trade at this port. An example of the predominance of the Dutch was the monopoly of companies from the Low Countries in the trade in certain products such as cocoa or cochineal. They also exported most fabrics and textile manufactured goods to the ports of Spanish America, just as they did in the 17th century.
highly likely that, without the help of these families, the fleets would not have overcome the crisis experienced early in the century. For example, the fleet of New Spain organised by Fernando Chacón set sail with a cargo of textile goods worth about 371,777 silver reales, consigned mainly by the Coghen y Montefr o family on behalf of Joseph de Leyza. 42 Other Cadiz-based merchants loaded ships on their own behalf; for example, the case of Francisco Joseph Van Hemert, who loaded on the fleets a total of 16,091 palmos, and an equivalent amount of wine and spirits during the 1720s and up to the 1760s. Van Hemert, born into a family originally from Haarlem, exemplified the majority of Cadiz traders. 43 This family were exporters of textile products and metals, and occasionally importers of agricultural products, which were, as mentioned previously, merchandise for the Europebound returning ships. There is nothing to indicate any differences in this involvement from that described here; however most of the time the Dutch dealt only in manufactured products.
Second and third Dutch and Flemish generations became completely Spanish, an advantageous process not only to themselves, but also to the trading companies of their relatives in the Low Countries, as the latter would trade through the former. This was the reason why the Flemish citizens were always the first to be accused of contravening the principle prohibition of the Spanish monopoly receiving instructions from foreigners. Flemish descendents were granted a good many licenses by the Casa de la Contratación. These licenses allowed them not only to load goods but also to travel on board the fleets. However, this was only a part of the relationship existing between Cadiz and America developed by Dutch companies; on many occasions, an indirect involvement has been mentioned, characterised mainly as being an illegal, under-cover activity.
There were other parallel means of involvement in the shipping of merchandise through the fleets and galleons. One was participation in the so-called "tonnage licences", a practice by which a tonnage permit was obtained from the Casa de Contratación, with portions of this licence sold later to other traders, many of them foreigners. This strategy was strictly illegal since it was the carrier who bought and received the tonnage rights. However, in practice the selling-on of these rights was accepted by society. Both groups benefited: the Spanish traders profited from selling the "right to load" to other businessmen in Cadiz while the fleet was being prepared; the other because they were able to load their products with the certainty that on the return of the fleets they would receive their American proceeds either in kind or silver, even when unregistered. Some of those taking part in this subterfuge were, occasionally, caught in the act by the authorities of the Casa de Contratación, especially during the period when Minister José Patiño forced the monopoly authorities to fulfil their supervisory duties by applying punishments and fines to any violation of the rules.
In 1727 the fleet administration seized the frigates El Carmen and La Fidela, whose captains Victorio Reboll n and Adrián Scofrán had agreed to bring unregistered silver on behalf of foreign traders. One fifth of the value of these seizures was destined for payment of the royal rights of almojarifazgos and for the Barlovento Armada (convoy destined for the Leewards Island). Further, a sum of up to 52,107 reales levied on wine and liquor merchandise would go towards the expenditure in riggings and naval equipment. This was part of the fleet to La Havana under the charge of Antonio Gaztañeta. 44 In other cases, such as that of Captain Joseph Lozada, registered for Cuba, 200 tonnes of clothing and fruit were also seized but made exempt from the "Rights of Aliens" for having served the Navy. 45 The involvement of a testaferro or middleman or Spanish agent was one of frequent ways to participate, by loading the fleets with goods stored on behalf of or brought into the city by foreigners. The foreign merchants appreciated the importance of Cadiz as a place to deposit money, as a warehouse, and information centre. This explains the existence of such large numbers of documents from notary offices in Cadiz stating the true identity of the owners of the ships merchandise. The involvement is best illustrated from the way the merchants themselves described it, although there are only a very few cases where the merchants admitted their engagement in such trade. Christian Duisbergh embarked, on galleons arranged by the Conde de Casa Alegre, "a bale of merchandise in the name of Juan Arteaga y Ochoa, on whose behalf the receipt was signed at the foot of the invoice by 44 AGI, Arribadas 133. 45 Licence of José Patiño, Madrid, August 5th, 1728: AGI, Arribadas 13A.
Cristóbal de Barrabarzena, who was his consignee". 46 Since the consignee had died, the trade officials, by virtue of the contents of the invoice, collected the capital belonging to the Dutchman from the Consulate of Cadiz, worth 5,446 pesos and five reales. Before his death, Juan de Arteaga had secretly signed a deed for the same amount, with Joseph of Iriarte as beneficiary, who should then pass the money to Duisbergh. Apparently, this Dutch merchant had various other sums of money deposited in the Consulate through invoices for goods sent to America on various fleets or on registered ships.
This method of collaboration between Flemish and Dutch merchants in Cadiz had been increasing since 1720. However, in 1740 the implementation of the system using individual registered ships meant a reinforcement of the alliance between both colonies with the aim of embarking a large amount of merchandise. The implementation of such a system helped Dutch merchants to profit again from the gold and silver arriving in Cadiz, being heavily involved with most of the Flemish traders based in Cadiz, who would serve as holders of their merchandise and capital on deposit; the money was then used to finance cargoes bound for the Indies. According to information found in the newspaper Amsterdam News, the highest percentage of American gold and silver between 1748 and 1753 (in libras tornesas and piastras, although no actual figures are quoted) came from New Spain; Lima and Cartagena also sent large sums, with similar amounts quoted for each, as well as Buenos Aires and Caracas. These ports were the most frequented by Cadiz traders from the Low Countries during that period. 47 Registered ships were an interesting alternative to the system of fleets, although there were many risks involved. Atlantic battles always posed a threat for registered ships, and such trips were likely to end up as shipwrecks or to be victims of attacks. Although in 1754 the fleet system was restored, there are few indications that Dutch merchants used them as before, and the use of registered ships continued to be the preferred way. This spectacular growth could have been encouraged by a new era of hegemony for Dutch trade in Cadiz. In the 1750s and 1760s, the number of Dutch ships in the bay of Cadiz appeared to increase (up to 155, or by 38.1%) while there was a sharp decline in 46 48 Between 1758 and 1762 various quantities of gold and silver were taken to the Dutch Republic reaching amounts of between 1,111,000 escudos in weight and 4,770,000 in 1760. 49 The problems in the American colonies reflected the rivalry in the very heart of the Spanish monopoly. An example of this situation was in 1759, when the members of the Amsterdam firm Pierre and Stephanus Locquet granted power of proxy to the Cadiz firm Verduc & Vincent Co, in order to collect goods to be loaded onto the Dutch ship De Vreede, which had been captured in Jamaica by English corsairs. Such incidents were also evident in Port au Prince and other Caribbean ports. These problems diverted attention away from Cadiz, and the Dutch seemed to concentrate on American ports. The Anglo-Dutch trade in Caribbean ports had many problems during the Seven Years' War. 50 It is thought that active involvement was somehow sustained by close collaboration with the Spaniards. Obviously, in such a problematic historical context, negotiating through Spanish middlemen was one of the main methods of gaining access to the American silver loaded on the returning fleets. One of the widespread tactics was to secretly load goods on the ships bound for the Indies directly from Dutch ships anchored in the Bay of Cadiz. On the return of the fleets, the same strategy would be used, loading the silver straight onto Dutch ships which would then sail as part of the convoy to Amsterdam. Using a middleman or testaferro was perfectly acceptable to Dutch firms, as they shamelessly stated in 1716, in order to avoid the confiscation of merchandise and precious metals by the Spanish authorities. This strategy poses one of the main difficulties that make it impossible to quantify Dutch trade with America. According to the Dutch, They added that "this was a necessary practice in order to avoid the confiscations of goods". 51 The procedure was as follows: merchants would sell their products to a Spanish merchant that would make a part payment in advance. The balance went as credit, usually through a marine risk contract.
These practices normally worked perfectly, unless misfortune struck, which would hinder the delivery of the profits to the actual owner of the merchandise. In the previously mentioned example of Christian Duisbergh in 1738, the shipment of goods for America was declared as belonging to Juan de Arteaga y Ochoa, a Cadiz citizen and a member of the Order of St James. This course of action was necessary "as the grantor is not allowed because he is of a foreign nation".
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In such cases, foreign merchants could be hit by unpleasant news: the seizure of their gold and silver in service to the Crown. These confiscated goods would almost invariably be returned to their owners, albeit late, plus any interest accrued. On certain occasions, the money seized by the Crown was returned as an amount, or as a tonnage license, which, paradoxically, seemed to set the cycle of trade in motion again.
The involvement of the registered ships was, maybe, the most lucrative business. Although this type of shipment had a precedent from the years immediately after the Peace of Munster (1648), it was perfected in the 18th century, and the volume increased due to diverse institutional factors, such as the implementation of the reform process in Spain. The main consequence of this process was, without doubt, an increase in registered ships, which began to reach a high number of American ports. There was an endemic problem in Spain which forced merchants to devise a specific strategy: the lack of production in Spanish shipbuilding. This problem meant that foreign ships had to be used in order to get sufficient ships for the Spanish convoys to America. 53 In such cases, Amsterdam companies conferred powers of proxy and sent money to their partners in Cadiz to enable them to include their ships in the despatch of the fleets. These ships set off with the same cargo (or maybe with new merchandise loaded in the Bay of Cadiz) heading for America.
In a proxy from the year 1710 there is an order given with the clear purpose of sending goods on board the fleets to the Indies on behalf of a correspondent. This correspondent either travelled on the ship as an agent or was already living in America, and was responsible for the merchandise "to be sold in the West Indies on behalf of Gaspar and Manuel Winjgaert". 54 The consignees found another lucrative business: the buying and selling of Dutch ships, or even ships of other nationalities, to be later sent to America as individually registered ships escorted in convoy by warships. The cases registered by notaries, although not many, offer significant examples of direct commercial trips to America. While some of the vessels were not built in Dutch shipyards, they were all consigned to Cadiz-based Flemish or Dutch merchants and were sold in the city. Such was the case of a ship from Genoa bought by "Henrique de Roo and Sons" after buying a sailing license for the Indies, or the case of the formerly English vessel San Felipe, bought by Livino B. Van den Broucke, which sailed to Buenos Aires. The La Galera del Naranjo Dorado from Hamburg was also bought in the bay. 55 Shortly afterwards, Admiral Adrián Colarte became her proud owner, although the ship had just arrived in Cadiz with a cargo of goods consigned to the Flemish merchants Bellot and Warnck. 56 In general terms, the practice of selling a vessel in Cadiz was as follows: the agreed price was paid -sometimes this included an amount of money for the captain -together with, in some cases, a gift which could be a hat or also money. 57 In addition, the alcabala, an import tax, had to be paid together with a 4% tax for the General Collection of Rents of the city. The payment of tax shows that the Spanish authorities were perfectly aware of such transactions. 58 When the ship was sold in Cadiz, the repayment schedule terms were set by the carrier. Usually, selling the ship complete with its cargo and crew meant keeping a significant share of the total trading business with the Indies. In May 1743, Lorenzo Del Arco, a Cadiz merchant, bought a ship from the Directie van de Levantse Handel called the Ana María Galley. The asking price was 36,000 florins, inclusive of the cargo. Amsterdam merchant Louis Laer hired Jacob Jacobsenz, an interpreter, with these instructions: "[...] if you happen, although I doubt it, to find a gentleman inclined to the purchase of the ship with all her belongings save for the passport of Algiers, you should obtain for her 3,000 florins, average currency of Holland, hard cash first thing and in no other way".
The ship eventually fetched 32,000 florins ("1.000 pesos escudos en plata vieja de a 128 cuartos"). 59 Commerce continued to grow in Cadiz. Its peak was reached soon after the use of registered ships became widespread, with the extensive involvement of foreign traders. 60 Commercial companies in Cadiz were openly involved because, from 1739 onwards, registered ships were sailing more frequently than fleets and galleons. Traders who enjoyed special privileges as citizens of Flanders were financially involved openly in the fitting out of the registered ships and used to appoint a manager to liaise with a consignee appointed by the registered licensee in order to oversee all operations. 61 Dutch traders also collaborated with the Spaniards using a method ("supercargo" or sobrecargo), whereby several Spaniards jointly obtained a licence for a shipment to the Indies. Foreign merchants introduced their products into the shipment after providing a loan to the Spanish licensees. This particular method of trading was known as participation or sharing in the tonnage licences, and the licensees were allowed to share in a ship's cargo for a certain number of tons which were then made available on the open market. Dutch vessels were often used, with the Flemish consignee of the ship providing the Spaniards with capital to pay the administration for the licence. This kind of mortgage-like loan entitled both the consignee and the captain to load their own merchandise on the ship; such loans also allowed the creditors to embark their own goods.
On other occasions, a Dutch registered vessel would be made available to Cadiz merchants by her Flemish owner. Such was the case of Livino Bernardo van den Broeck, owner of the Ana María y San Félix, captained by Joseph Félix de Flores, who was granted permission by the King to send a registered ship to Cartagena de Indias. On February 15th, 1748, the captain became the proxy for the owner, in charge of raising the capital needed for the trip. 62 Such powers of proxy show the existing obligations of the captain and the owner of the registered ship. The captain was fully accountable for all monies, payments to officers and crew, hiring the crew for the return trip, and for the maintenance and upkeep of the ship. With regard to his strictly commercial duties, the captain was also responsible for delivering the merchandise to the consignee; this was then loaded on the ship ready for departure exactly as stated on the register. Once in Cartagena, the appropriate certificates were requested from the royal officials. Both captain and consignee were also responsible for the sale of the goods.
CONCLUSION
The main obstacle faced by foreign traders was becoming part, in a symbiotic way, of the social environment of the commercial cities where they settled. In the case of Cadiz, as had already happened in Seville before, their efforts were directed towards counteracting the rigid system imposed by the Spanish trading monopoly with America and the harsh laws against the foreign commerce in Spain. Those forming part of the trading communities were able to overcome most Spanish laws, to a lesser or greater degree, due to the development of a number of mechanisms within families and the surrounding networks, the cooperation and trust, and as a result from sophisticated methods of avoiding the vigilance of the Crown. Curiously, the number of naturalisation documents issued to Dutch and the Flemish nationals by the Casa de Contratación were very few compared with the size and activity levels of their communities. Comparisons between these documents and those registered by notaries show the transient nature of many of these businessmen, who continued to trade with America despite the absence of naturalisation papers or the right to stay, either through smuggling practices or by a number of legal strategies to penetrate the Spanish monopoly and carry merchandise on the New Spain and Tierra Firme convoys. Since quantitative studies are not possible on smuggling or illegal trading, a study of the workings of these cooperation strategies, based on apparently legal stratagems, could offer new perspectives on the communities of foreign merchants and their economic activities.
These communities were not just isolated, impenetrable groups within the Spanish Society of the Ancient Regime but were strongly rooted within it. Alongside the smuggling practices, the main purpose of their activities revolved around a number of sophisticated and varied legal mechanisms. Thus, the activities can be divided into legal practices (or stratagems used to hide within the legality), and the smuggling and fraud mechanisms themselves. In the first activities we can group various methods which were marginally legal (such as obtaining the naturalisation letters, permits or licences) or other practices which, although illegal, were tacitly accepted by Spanish society because they were all involved in them. Some of these practices, such as the incorporation of ships arriving from other ports into the Spanish fleets, the cooperation with local intermediaries, the use of middlemen or commissions, or the creation of companies together with Spanish merchants (for whom they then became exclusive providers of merchandise from their countries of origin) -became commonly accepted by society and even by the Spanish authorities, who openly took part in these very lucrative businesses.
Nevertheless, these mechanisms became increasingly complex as trading communities grew in numbers and the international networks they represented strengthened. In the case of those communities formed by traders from all Dutch provinces (the Dutch Republic and the Southern Netherlands alike), their commercial and financial activities were closely linked. These foreign traders controlled the interrelations between the supply and storage of products, becoming intermediaries between the capitalists (generally the commercial houses in Northern Europe), the suppliers of raw materials and manufactured products, and commercial agents who specialised in the consignment of ships and re-exports to America. Due to the scarcity of Spanish manufactures, even the Spaniards themselves were forced to buy in Europe, bringing the merchandise to Cadiz, storing and then selling it to American markets.
Authors such as Henry Kamen have pointed out the mistake in accepting the Spanish viewpoint (reiterated by many historians) that foreign trade was the downfall of the colonial economy and Atlantic commerce. The fact that foreign traders in Spanish cities and the commercial houses of Northern Europe, with their counterparts in Spain and America, practiced smuggling is not a historic or scientific justification for such a statement. The reality is that their presence made an incalculable contribution to both the colonial and the Spanish economies. The informal smuggling economy was also most common and at the same time essential for survival, and -quoting Enriqueta Vila Vilar -this unofficial commerce was dominant and therefore the official one.
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In conclusion, the foreign influence on the economic activity related to the Carrera de Indias did not only continue but strengthened. A crucial fact for understanding the failure of the laws against foreigners is that their businesses were beneficial to the Spaniards. Those who were really in control of the commerce in the Indies were the people of Cadiz, both locals and foreign, together with businessmen from other cities of the Iberian Peninsula who also traded in one way or another with America. They were all involved in fraud and smuggling in some way, the best methods of becoming part of the profitable commercial market. Foreigners obtained benefits from the Spaniards, many of them relatives, associates and friends, and the Spaniards became allies with the foreigners in exchange for capital, manufactured goods, and their cooperation in committing tax frauds. By the end of the 18th century most of the communities were virtually assimilated into Spanish society and, as it has often happened throughout history, subjecting foreigners to special legislation became an anachronism.
